Skip Navigation


Public Health Ethics Advance Access originally published online on June 4, 2008
Public Health Ethics 2008 1(2):110-123; doi:10.1093/phe/phn017
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
1/2/110    most recent
phn017v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Ravvin, M.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow Articles by Ravvin, M.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press. Available online at www.phe.oxfordjournals.org

Incentivizing Access and Innovation for Essential Medicines: A Survey of the Problem and Proposed Solutions

Michael Ravvin*

Columbia University

* Corresponding author: Michael Ravvin, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 Email: mer2133{at}columbia.edu


  Abstract

The existing intellectual property regime discourages the innovation of, and access to, essential medicines for the poor in developing countries. A successful proposal to reform the existing system must address these challenges of access and innovation. This essay will survey the problems in the existing pharmaceutical patent system and offer critical analysis of some reform proposals. I will argue that existing mechanisms that are intended to mitigate the harms of the current pharmaceutical patent system, such as bulk buying, differential pricing and compulsory licenses, are inadequate and perhaps even counter-productive over the long-term. Other incentive mechanisms based on push funding, such as government research grants, are inefficient and limited in scope. Pull mechanisms, which offer some reward for successful pharmaceutical innovations, offer a more promising incentive mechanism. I will evaluate three pull mechanisms -- Priority Review Vouchers, Advance Market Commitment (AMC) and the Health Impact Fund -- on the basis of their capacity to incentivize access and innovation, as well as their efficiency and political feasibility. Though the Health Impact Fund appears to be the most promising proposal, more work must be done to overcome challenges of its implementation.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Public Health EthicsHome page
J. Sonderholm
A Reform Proposal in Need of Reform: A Critique of Thomas Pogge's Proposal for How to Incentivize Research and Development of Essential Drugs
Public Health Ethics, July 3, 2009; (2009) php017v1.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Public Health EthicsHome page
D. Sridhar
Improving Access to Essential Medicines: How Health Concerns can be Prioritised in the Global Governance System
Public Health Ethics, July 1, 2008; 1(2): 83 - 88.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Public Health EthicsHome page
A. Hollis
The Health Impact Fund: A Useful Supplement to the Patent System?
Public Health Ethics, July 1, 2008; 1(2): 124 - 133.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.