Fair Process and the Redundancy of Bioethics: A Polemic
Queen Mary, University of London
* Corresponding author. Queen Mary, University of London, School of Law, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK. Tel: +442078825126, Fax: +442089818733, Email: r.ashcroft{at}qmul.ac.uk
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Abstract |
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Recent doctrine in both national and international organisations concerned with public health planning and resource allocation has it that direct ethical justification of substantive decisions is so difficult as to be impossible. Instead, we should agree on criteria of procedural justice and reach decisions whose justification lies in how they are arrived at, rather than any direct ethical justification on the ground of substantive moral principles. In this polemical article, I argue that this amounts to a serious dereliction of intellectual duty on the part of the bioethics community. Our role in these settings is to produce and defend the best substantive arguments we can. Failing to do this makes bioethicists at best redundant and at worst leads us to seriously defective conclusions. The argument is illustrated by analysis of the ethical frameworks for resource allocation under the UNAIDS ‘3 by 5’ programme and for pandemic influenza planning.
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